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WE’RE ALL EXPERTS NOW:
A SECURITY CASE AGAINST SECURITY DETENTION
Deborah Pearlstein*
While a range of U.S. and international law scholars have criticized 
the United States’ current approach to counterterrorism detention opera-
tions, some of the same voices are now recommending the development of a 
more formally sanctioned “preventive” regime for detaining terrorist sus-
pects going forward. With a view both to resolving current dilemmas like 
the status of detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, and 
to meeting the anticipated ongoing security interests of the United States, 
scholars like Jack Goldsmith, Robert Chesney, and others have emphasized 
the legitimate national interest in the “preventive incapacitation of uniform-
less terrorists who have the capacity to inflict mass casualties and enorm-
ous economic harms and who thus must be stopped before they act.” This 
essay reviews the basis for the current interest in “preventive” detention 
regimes, and considers whether such a program is consistent with effective 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy writ large. The essay concludes that even if 
it were possible to construct a preventive detention regime that satisfies 
U.S. and international legal restrictions, it is not at all clear such a scheme 
would advance the security interest its proponents identify.   
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal lesson that emerges from the articles in this volume—
sometimes express, sometimes implied—is that there is no categorical in-
ternational law prohibition of administrative detention.  Perhaps better put, 
there is no categorical prohibition against states’ depriving individuals of 
liberty for reasons other than their having committed criminal offenses or 
engaged in armed conflict.  Such a proposition could hardly be doubted.  In 
the United States, for example, the federal government operates a vast and 
vigorous program of immigration detention. The sovereign states operate 
their own civil commitment regimes, which generally authorize them to 
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participants in the Expert Meeting on Security Detention, organized by International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross & the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, and the Princeton Program in Law and Public Affairs for 
its support during the preparation of this essay. The author also would like to thank Gabor 
Rona, Hina Shamsi, and Alec Walen for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. 
578 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:577 
detain, subject to various procedural restrictions, those who by reason of 
mental illness or incapacity are found to pose a danger to themselves or 
others. The U.S. Supreme Court consistently has embraced such detention 
systems, provided that the systems comply with a set of procedural safe-
guards far more detailed—and in some respects more exacting— than any-
thing set forth expressly in international human rights or humanitarian law.1
Such detention regimes, of course, are not without controversy.  
What constitutes fair process in non-criminal detention systems remains the 
subject of steady litigation on both domestic and international law grounds. 
There are complex questions regarding what circumstances justify detention 
and how long a detainee may be permissibly held.2 But these issues exist to 
one degree or another, no matter what kind of detention regime a state has 
in place. The task of determining what process is due is a fraught one, and 
inescapable, whether the task falls to a traditional Article III court, an ex-
ecutive branch administrative court, or some hybrid tribunal created by the 
judicial, executive, or legislative body.  
Given the general acceptability of non-criminal detention for pur-
poses of regulating immigration and the like, if a state chooses to construct 
a new detention regime with a rigorous set of procedures to safeguard 
against arbitrariness, then why should one object to such a system for the 
plausibly sensible, separate purpose of achieving “the legitimate preventive 
incapacitation of uniformless terrorists who have the capacity to inflict mass 
casualties and enormous economic harms and who thus must be stopped 
before they act”?3 This essay is devoted to considering that question. 
It is important to note, however, that the answer offered here turns 
far more on international security policy than on international security law. 
It is a chronic feature of courts’ and lawyers’ writing in the realm of securi-
ty matters to begin by disclaiming any expertise in the area, thereby exclud-
ing from their deliberation all but the most passing consideration of whether 
a particular security policy is a good idea, or whether it is even rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
have explained:  
Whether the government justifiably detains al Qaeda suspects without 
charging and trying them depends to a large extent on the magnitude of the 
threat, the importance of secrecy, and other factors that few people outside 
1 See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (immigration detention); Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (civil commitment).  
2 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (discussing whether a Kansas sta-
tute’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied substantive due process requirements for 
civil commitment); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (discussing whether aliens may 
be detained indefinitely pending deportation). 
3 Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal 
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2008).  
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of government are in a position to evaluate…. [W]e have no opinion about 
the merits of particular security measures adopted after 9/11…. Our point 
is that we are not well positioned to judge the merits of those policies, nor 
are the civil libertarian critics of those policies.4
Posner and Vermeule assert that they do not know enough about security 
decisions regarding detention or the use of force to evaluate whether such 
decisions are good or bad. Yet they are able to determine that: (1) good res-
ponses are necessarily “swift, vigorous, and secretive”; (2) power should be 
concentrated in an emergency and should “move up from the states to the 
federal government”; (3) limiting liberties will reliably enhance security; 
and (4) it is not possible for anyone (presumably including the real experts) 
to evaluate whether decisions, when made in an emergency, are good or 
bad.5 Such self-refuting positions help ensure that the merits of such pro-
grams remain assumed rather than explained. 
Posner and Vermeule are hardly alone in this approach. When the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered in Johnson v. Eisentrager whether non-
citizens held in U.S. military custody abroad had a right to habeas corpus, 
the Court peppered its opinion with reasoning about the security costs that 
would attend an affirmative finding.6 Of course, if the Eisentrager Court 
had the functional competence to determine as a matter of fact that review 
of military detention “would hamper the war effort and bring aid and com-
fort to the enemy[, and] … would diminish the prestige of [the U.S.’s] 
commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals,”7 then it 
4 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY,
AND THE COURTS 9 (2007). 
5 Id. at 15–16, 18, 21–22.  Indeed, the authors regularly offer substantive evaluations of 
the effectiveness of various security decisions.  See, e.g., id. at 22 (positing a “tradeoff the-
sis” as the idea that neither liberty nor security can be “maximized without regard to the 
other”).   
6 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950). 
7 Id. at 779; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534–35 (2004) (“We think it 
unlikely that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmak-
ing that the Government forecasts.”); id. (“What are the allowable limits of military discre-
tion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial ques-
tions.”) (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)); Home Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (the war power “is a power to wage war suc-
cessfully . . .”).  While the Court’s rejection of the presidentially created military commis-
sions at Guantanamo Bay was in key respects driven by its interpretation of a statutory com-
mand, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 620 (2006) (Uniform Code of Military Justice 
requires that “the rules applied to military commissions must be the same as those applied to 
courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable”), the extraordinarily detailed 
attention the Court gave to evaluating the practical need for the commissions’ alternative trial 
procedures should leave little question that the majority justices had constitutional separation 
of powers concerns in mind, see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Trial 
by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order. . . . Inso-
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would be surprising to assume it lacks the institutional competence to eva-
luate similar facts and conclude under other circumstances that the exercise 
of habeas would not diminish the prestige of command, or that wavering 
potential terrorists would be most galvanized by the absence of judicial re-
view.8  Either way, there can be little doubt that even as lawyers deny their 
ability to consider such matters, legal judgments in this field are rife with 
independent affirmative assertions about what is necessary to combat a 
threat in theory and what works in practice.   
To be clear, there is utility in analyses of administrative detention 
that do not engage in their own assessment of security effectiveness.  Many 
fine pieces reasonably assume a particular state of affairs—for example, that 
states are exercising such powers already—and seek to understand the legal 
consequences under those circumstances.  It is a great service to identify the 
best procedural practices for states that choose to pursue a regime of securi-
ty detention.9 It is equally a service to look for legitimate legal compromise 
on such questions in states struggling to correct the failings of security de-
tention practices extant.10  But it is no service to endorse the lasting adop-
tion of such a regime, even one with sterling procedural credentials, purely 
as the least-worst alternative chosen from an existing array of policies that 
may or may not have any merit as a matter of counterterrorism security. Put 
differently, it is not enough to endorse administrative security detention 
because it is, for example, easier to detain more people that way than under 
the traditional criminal or military detention. One must also explain why it 
will be a net help in preventing terrorism.  Those who advocate adopting a 
“third-way” security system have not effectively made this case.  Indeed, as 
discussed below, there remain reasons to believe such a regime would do 
U.S. national security more harm than good. 
                                                     
far as the ‘[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures’ for the military commissions at issue 
deviate from court-martial practice, the deviations must be explained by some such practical 
need.”).  
8 See infra text accompanying notes 17–18 (noting strategic disadvantages a “preventive” 
detention regime might pose).  
9 See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: 
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE INT’L L. J. 369, 373; Jelena 
Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in 
Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 858 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 375, 375 
(2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-858-p375?
opendocument (proposing a set of procedural safeguards to be applied in all cases of depriva-
tion of liberty for security reasons).
10 See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1081. 
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II. COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION IN CONTEXT
When it comes to discussions of the task of preventing catastrophic 
terrorist attacks, the contrast between legal literature and security literature 
is striking. Based on the legal scholarship, one could hardly be blamed for 
concluding that the principal weapons any state uses to prevent terrorist 
attacks are custodial detention and coercive interrogation. If a state fails to 
detain the right person or fails to elicit the essential information, the argu-
ment goes, one may as well give up all hope of imagining we can avoid 
losing a city (or more) to terrorist attack. Not that we legal scholars are en-
tirely at fault; such practices are certainly at the heart of legal debates over 
terrorism prevention. 
But as prevalent as detention and interrogation topics are in the le-
gal scholarship, they are as noticeable for their absence in security scholar-
ship. The principal recommendations of the vast majority of post-9/11 re-
ports in the security literature that address prevention of or response to a 
nuclear terrorist attack propose rights-neutral measures entirely unrelated to 
detention and  interrogation.11 For example, experts generally agree that 
efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism must centrally include efforts to prevent 
illicit trafficking or theft from one of the known facilities capable of produc-
ing fissile material, or known stockpiles of such material. As a result, the 
wide assortment of official and expert recommendations regarding the pre-
vention of nuclear proliferation (other than those related to bureaucratic 
reorganization) place top priority on urging greater international cooperative 
efforts to inventory, secure, deter, and track the disposition of these mate-
rials.12
11 See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 380–81 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf 
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]; THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE 
CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 527–32 (March 31, 2005) [hereinafter WMD
COMMISSION REPORT]; MATTHEW BUNN & ANTHONY WEIR, SECURING THE BOMB 2006, at 
121–37 (2006), available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/stb06webfull.pdf [hereinafter 
SECURING THE BOMB]; GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE
PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE 143–56 (2004); Linton F. Brooks, Toward an Integrative Ap-
proach to Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE AFTER FIFTY
YEARS? 104 (Pilat, ed. 2007); Laura S.H. Holgate, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS 
FOR PEACE: A FUTURE AFTER FIFTY YEARS? 111 (Pilat, ed. 2007); Richard Falkenrath, Con-
fronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism, SURVIVAL 43–65 (1998), reprinted in
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM (O’Day, ed. 2004).   
12 See WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 527–32 (recommending that the 
United States pursue additional bilateral ship-boarding agreements to help tag, track, and 
locate vessels of proliferation concern); 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 380–81 
(making three recommendations to guard against WMD proliferation: (1) “work with the 
international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal 
jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution” of nuclear smugglers; (2) 
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The foregoing is not intended to suggest that detention and interro-
gation never matter in the prevention of terrorism.  Rather, it is to place the 
discussion of detention schemes in context—a context in which the detain-
ing state is constantly balancing not only liberty and security interests, but 
also, for example, strategic interests in “winning hearts and minds” against 
shorter term tactical goals like preventing a particular attack. Indeed, there 
is substantial consensus that the United States would be better served by a 
counterterrorism policy that deploys a range of instruments of national 
power—including economic, diplomatic, cultural, and educational meas-
ures—all, ideally complementarily, geared toward diminishing the terrorist 
threat.13  That military force may be a useful element of this strategy is 
broadly recognized; the U.S. conventional military invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001, for instance, won broad support in the United States and in Eu-
rope.14 At the same time, intelligence collection, public diplomacy,15 and 
traditional criminal justice,16 remain regularly used tools against the threat 
                                                     
expand U.S. engagement with international partnerships using military, economic and dip-
lomatic tools to interdict shipments of concern, including by expanding partners to include 
Russia and China; and (3) expand the 1991 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and 
related efforts in partnership with Russia to secure fissile and related materials in the former 
Soviet Union); see also, e.g., SECURING THE BOMB, supra note 11, at 121–37 (describing 
various U.S. security measures); ALLISON, supra note 11, at  143–56; Brooks, supra note 11, 
at 104–07. 
13 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 363–64 (“[L]ong-term success [in 
efforts to pursue al Qaeda] demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, 
intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, 
and homeland defense. . . .”); James A. Baker III & Warren Christopher, More Ways to Stay 
Safe, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at A33. 
14 See GALLUP ORGANIZATION, ATTACK ON AMERICA: KEY TRENDS AND INDICATORS, Dec. 
18, 2001, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/5011/Attack-America-Key-Trends-
Indicators.aspx#2 (summarizing polling data between September–December 2001 as show-
ing between eighty and ninety percent of the American public supported military action in 
Afghanistan); PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS DIFFER 
WIDELY ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, April 17, 2002,  available at http://pewglobal.org/repo 
rts/display.php?PageID=452 (reporting 2002 polls in France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. 
finding  fifty-nine and seventy-three percent support for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan). 
Note, however, that a post-9/11 Gallup survey of predominantly Muslim nations found that 
majorities in each viewed the war in Afghanistan as unjustified. See PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES 
PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL SURVEYS: WHAT WE ARE FINDING, Apr. 29, 2002, available at htt
p://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=46.  
15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-795T, U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
STRATEGIC PLANNING EFFORTS HAVE IMPROVED, BUT AGENCIES FACE SIGNIFICANT 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES (2007) (describing scope of State Department and related 
public diplomacy activities), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi 
?dbname=gao&docid=f:d07795t.pdf.  
16 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 36 
(June 22, 2006), available at 
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of terrorism. In such a complex environment, where tools deployed with one 
hand may have a significant impact on the likely success of tools held by 
the other, it would be foolish to imagine that operations as significant, and 
inevitably public, as detention and interrogation can operate in an effective-
ness vacuum.  
Particularly in the challenge of counterterrorism detention policy, 
the United States has had to face the reality that programs it has pursued 
principally for tactical purposes have resulted in significant strategic set-
backs.  As one recent and striking poll of a bipartisan group of leading U.S. 
foreign policy experts found, eighty-seven percent of experts polled be-
lieved that features of the U.S. detention system had hurt more than helped 
in the fight against Al Qaeda.17 Indeed, detention programs have at times 
resulted in significant tactical losses. Britain, America’s close ally, pulled 
out of planned joint counterterrorism operations with the CIA because it 
could not obtain adequate assurances that U.S. agents would refrain from 
rendition or cruel treatment.18 The costs of such trade-offs may be especially 
acute in some circumstances—for example, if securing international coop-
eration for the disposition of fissile material is central to a state’s strategic 
counterterrorism plan.   
                                                     
 http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (touting DOJ 
terrorism prosecution record); Jeffrey Breinholt, Islam in American Courts: 2007 Year in 
Review, Jan. 7, 2008, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.177/pub_detail.asp.  
17 Guantanamo’s Shadow, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, at 40, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200710/guantanamo-poll  (“Nothing has hurt America’s 
image and standing in the world—and nothing has undermined the global effort to combat 
nihilistic terrorism—than the brutal torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu 
Ghraib and in other prisons (secret or otherwise). America can win the fight against terrorism 
only if it acts in ways consistent with the values for which it stands; if its behavior descends 
to the level employed by the terrorists, then we have all become them instead of us.”).  
18 See Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. Treatment of Ter-
ror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A6 (“Britain pulled out of some planned covert 
operations with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a major one in 2005, when it was 
unable to obtain assurances that the actions would not result in rendition and inhumane 
treatment, the report said.”). The full report of the Committee is available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/intelli
gence/20070725_isc_final.pdf (follow link for “Report into Rendition”). See also Craig 
Whitlock, Testimony Helps Detail CIA's Post-9/11 Reach, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at A1 
(quoting State Department legal adviser John B. Bellinger III as indicating that ongoing 
disputes with U.S. allies have “undermined cooperation and intelligence activities”). Indeed, 
a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found global public opinion of the United 
States, and particularly support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, dropping in 2006. Brian 
Knowlton, Global Image of the U.S. is Worsening, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, 
at A1. Perhaps most poignant, as one U.S. Army intelligence officer who served in Afghanis-
tan put it in his subsequent book: “[t]he more a prisoner hates America, the harder he will be 
to break. The more a population hates America, the less likely its citizens will be to lead us to 
a suspect.” CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: TASK FORCE 500 AND 
AMERICA’S SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA, at xxi, xxv, 44–45 (2004). 
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These few examples cannot, of course, lead one conclusively to re-
ject a “preventive” detention regime. They should, however, suggest that the 
most one might reliably say about such a regime is that its effectiveness in 
preventing more terrorism than it promotes is uncertain. In addition, for 
those interested in determining what structural allocation of power might be 
most appropriate in operating a detention regime, it should also suggest the 
need to incorporate consideration of such trade-offs into the design of the 
regime from the outset. A decision-making structure that invariably favors 
tactics over strategy, or systematically forecloses the consideration of either 
tactical or strategic consequences, will fail to rationally evaluate such trade-
offs— an outcome in no one’s security interest. Finally, these examples may 
suffice to put the burden of persuasion on those seeking to promote a new 
approach to security detention. Since the strategic costs of any such system 
may well be high, it is necessary to conduct a rigorous assessment of its 
benefits.
III. WHEN DETENTION HELPS PREVENTION
States unquestionably have a legitimate interest in preventing harm 
to innocent civilians. Thus, detaining individuals who plan or have taken 
steps to involve themselves in a criminal conspiracy is a central example of 
a function the criminal law performs.19 Criminal conspiracy laws (and in-
choate offenses such as attempt) aim to prevent threats that are far enough 
along in their development to amount to “direct participation” in a criminal 
act, as well as threats so far along as to be actually imminent.20
From a security perspective, criminal law should be a highly attrac-
tive tool for securing the “preventive” detention of individuals falling into 
one of these categories. Assuming a state has adequate evidence (a signifi-
cant assumption at times), the criminal justice system offers an unquestion-
ably legitimate means for securing the (sometimes prolonged) pre-trial de-
tention and (potentially lifelong) post-trial incapacitation of a proven threat. 
Moreover, contrary to one of the oft-asserted but rarely supported policy 
arguments in legal literature, there is substantial evidence showing that the 
criminal justice process has been a significant source of intelligence infor-
mation.21 Indeed, the coercive power accompanying the threat of criminal 
19 See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 287 
(2005).
20 See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 411 (proposing a “direct participation” test, among other 
standards, as a means of guarding against arbitrariness in administrative detention). In this 
regard, though, Professor Hakimi’s scheme is indistinguishable (and perhaps more rigorous) 
than traditional criminal justice liability bases for detention.   
21 See, e.g., DANIEL BENJAMIN AND STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR: RADICAL 
ISLAM’S WAR AGAINST AMERICA xii–xiii (2003) (crediting transcripts from the major terror-
ism trials of recent years as a “treasure trove” of information related to the rise of terrorism 
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prosecution has proven successful many times over in securing information 
in exchange for favorable treatment.22
The more complicated question, however, is when it is in the securi-
ty interests of a state to detain individuals to prevent them from causing 
harm, but not in the state’s interest to prosecute them. The most commonly 
offered answers are: (1) where there is some evidence that an individual is 
planning or engaging in conduct of concern, but successful prosecution is in 
doubt because of procedural rules that, for example, restrict the admissibili-
ty of hearsay evidence or require the revelation of classified information; 
and (2) when the only evidence (admissible or no) giving rise to the ques-
tion of detention is an individual’s association with or membership in a ter-
rorist group.23 These circumstances pose somewhat different challenges, as 
discussed below.
                                                     
during the 1990’s) (“Reading through the nearly fifty thousand pages of testimony, we 
learned more about the risk of the new terrorism than we ever could have expected.  In many 
instances, we discovered information so crucial that we were amazed that the relevant agen-
cies did not inform us of it while we were at the NSC.”); see also Frontline: The Torture 
Question, (PBS television broadcast Jul. 13, 2005) (edited transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/cloonan.html) (interviewing FBI 
Agent Jack Cloonan and describing securing the cooperation of an accused terrorist in the 
course of interviews connected with criminal proceedings against him); see also NewsHour 
with Jim Lehrer: Debating Torture (PBS television broadcast Dec. 2, 2005) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec05/torture_12-02.html) (describing 
the advantages of operating within the law to obtain information rather than using torture). 
22 See, e.g., U.S. Dept’t of Justice, Waging the War on Terror, http://www.lifeandliberty 
.gov/subs/a_terr.htm (last visited Sep. 15, 2008) (describing successes in “gathering informa-
tion by leveraging criminal charges and long prison sentences,” and securing through plea-
bargaining  “critical intelligence about al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, safehouses, train-
ing camps, recruitment, and tactics in the United States, and the operations of those terrorists 
who mean to do Americans harm”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Earnest James 
Ujaama Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Supply Goods and Services to the Taliban, Apr. 14, 
2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/03_crm_237.htm.  See generally
Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 837 (2007) (Moore was Chief of the Violent Crimes and Terrorism Section 
in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York). 
23 See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1080–1081. While these two argu-
ments are the most uniformly advanced, there are certainly others, including the possibility 
of custodial interrogation—interviews purely for the purpose of gathering information. A full 
response to detention for that purpose is beyond the scope of this brief essay. But without 
veering too broadly into the extraordinary debates about the use of torture to extract informa-
tion, it may suffice to note that, according to the U.S. Government’s most thorough study to 
date into the use of coercive techniques to elicit information, “knowledge of behavioral indi-
cators that might assist in the detection of deception is very limited and provides little relia-
ble information that could assist intelligence collectors” with current populations of interest. 
Gary Hazlett, Research on Detection of Deception: What We Know vs. What We Think We 
Know, in EDUCING INFORMATION – INTERROGATION: SCIENCE AND ART – FOUNDATIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE 45, 52 (U.S. Intelligence Science Board, ed., 2006). Put differently, it is entirely 
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A. Preventing Terrorist Acts 
Since 9/11, more than one set of scholars has argued that 
“[r]elatively strict evidentiary and procedural rules make it very hard, and 
sometimes impossible, for the government to prosecute some terrorists that 
it has good reason to think may be very dangerous.”24  Such arguments have 
prompted precisely the right kind of legal questions. Specifically, such ar-
guments raise questions as to whether: (1) strict hearsay exclusion rules are 
required to satisfy due process; (2) some accommodation can be made to 
satisfy state classification interests as well as defendants’ confrontation 
rights; and (3) witnesses can be adequately protected. Those who cite such 
issues as grounds for supporting a system of “preventive” detention for sus-
pected terrorists do so in order to argue that an alternative forum could offer 
adjusted burdens of proof and evidence, geared toward accommodating the 
special challenges of terrorism cases.   
Of course, the challenges of evaluating what kinds of evidence are 
sufficiently reliable to be credited, how to protect properly classified infor-
mation, and the like, are challenges that exist in any detention scheme—
criminal, administrative, or military. The U.S. criminal justice system has 
handled such special needs cases in the context of organized crime, drug 
trafficking, and national security. In those contexts, the U.S. criminal justice 
system has retained the overall contours and organizational structure of the 
criminal justice process, and incorporated modified procedural rules such as 
current provisions for the treatment of classified evidence.25 Such rules are 
generally designed to leave the decision-makers significant flexibility, max-
imizing the likelihood that a reasonable balance will be struck in a particular 
case.26 Despite arguments that such adjustments inevitably bleed into proce-
dures governing mainline criminal prosecutions,27 there is little evidence 
that this has been the case in existing examples. The rules governing con-
spiracy prosecutions, for instance, remain noticeably different from those in 
non-conspiracy prosecutions, but courts are quite adapted to handling both.  
Given that such accommodations could be made for terrorism cases 
either within the existing criminal or military justice systems, or in a new 
“preventive” detention system, the central question of concern for security 
                                                     
unclear based on present knowledge how to secure the revelation of accurate information 
from an individual.     
24 Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1120; see also Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, 
The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; see generally Glenn M. Sulmasy, 
The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW 
ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2006). 
25 See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2000). 
26 See ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 441–42.  
27 See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 407–16. 
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policy-makers should be which institutional forum likely will be the most 
effective in helping to prevent terrorism overall. While there will be errors, 
of course, no matter what system one chooses, there are at least two reasons 
to expect the criminal justice process to be more effective in handling rele-
vant procedural accommodations. The first reason is structural in nature. 
Terrorism trials within the criminal justice system are conducted against a 
broad and deep array of background rules, norms, and professional ethics— 
rules that help guide the inevitable exercise of discretion by the decision-
maker tasked with making judgments about reliability, secrecy, and safety 
in an individual case. Such guidance flows not just from judges’ individual 
experience, but also from the well-understood norms of the range of profes-
sionals involved in the process (from investigators to attorneys), from well 
developed training and professional guidelines, and from the substantial 
body of decisional law involving procedural accommodations in analogous 
situations. The absence of such a professional infrastructure has been among 
the key failings of the military commission system at Guantanamo Bay, 
now in its seventh year of operation with just two completed trials.28 Indeed, 
studies of organizations tasked with managing high-risk decision-making 
(like the military) urge the importance of regular operating procedures and 
professional norms as a way of offsetting cultural and individual instincts 
that tend to skew decision-making and produce more errors, especially in 
times of crisis.29
Those who advocate a new “preventive” detention system in the 
United States would no doubt respond that their system would be designed 
to avoid the pitfalls of the Guantanamo regime. Specifically, those advo-
cates envision a regime under which rules and procedures would be set forth 
clearly in advance and, at least over time, participants in the system would 
develop the same (or indeed greater) set of professional commitments that 
agents in the criminal justice system now enjoy. To be sure, some of the 
mistakes made in the 2001 military commission venture seem as if they 
could have been avoided had there been even somewhat more attention to 
design and drafting from the outset. It is conceivable that a new administra-
tive apparatus might, over some length of time, develop a set of institutiona-
lized professional commitments comparable to those available today in the 
28 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2008, at A19. 
29 See, e.g., SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY: ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 205 (1993); JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY 
IN GOVERNMENT 24–60 (1985); see also U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initia-
tive: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, at 131–49, available at http://katrina.house.gov; accord
CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL,
INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 51–52 (2007) (describing deleterious effects of 
political cronyism at FEMA). 
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criminal system. But given the apparently immediate policy need for a high-
functioning detention system in the face of a terrorist threat broadly unders-
tood as both tactically urgent and strategically complex, it is not obvious 
why a security policy-maker would care to wait. This is especially true as it 
is not evident which direction the presence of background criminal justice 
norms would tend to skew (if at all) the operation of a “preventive” scheme, 
whether in favor of greater attention to individual rights or public risk.30 It 
does, however, seem clear that the risk of decision-making error is higher 
where there is little professional infrastructure to inform discretion exer-
cised in any direction.31
The second reason security policy-makers interested in terrorism 
prevention should favor dealing with detention through a criminal justice 
approach (with appropriate procedural accommodations) relates to one of 
the potential trade-offs between strategy and tactics attending many state 
counterterrorism efforts, in particular the high strategic price that may be 
paid by a system perceived as illegitimate. If recent history teaches any les-
son, it is that a modified proceeding in an otherwise accepted forum raises 
fewer legitimacy concerns than a modified proceeding in a novel forum.32
Indeed, as noted above, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that 
post-9/11 detainee policy has produced significant negative consequences 
for U.S. national security.33
Particularly in the case of “preventive” detention, it is difficult to 
imagine a hypothetical system that yields anything other than a reality of 
indefinite detention. It is true that most administrative detention schemes 
30 See generally Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903 (2004) 
(describing phenomenon of judicial deference to executive decisions in wartime). 
31 Political scientists studying organizations charged with managing high-risk endeavors 
have found that clear, well understood rules, formalized training, and planning can function 
to match sometimes-skewed cultural and individual instincts that emerge in a crisis. See, e.g.,
SAGAN, supra note 29 at 205; BENDOR supra note 29, at 24–60; see also U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, supra note 29, at 131–49.  
32 See, e g., Brief for 422 Current and Former Members of the United Kingdom and Euro-
pean Union Parliaments as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (arguing that military commission process fails to satisfy in-
ternational legal standards).  In contrast, the only amicus briefing during the entire extended 
federal criminal prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui was from media outlets seeking to 
broadcast trial proceedings, and from a non-governmental organization seeking to affirm a 
trial court ruling prohibiting the government from seeking the death penalty in the case.  See
Criminal Docket, United States v. Moussaoui, Case No. 1:01-cr-00455-ALL (E.D. Va. 
2008), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/DocketSheet.html; 
General Docket, United States v. Moussaoui, Case No. 03-4792 (4th Cir. 2005), available at
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/moussaoui4792/pdf/03-4792.pdf.
33 See Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold 
War World, 38 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. J. 547, 571–80 (2007) (discussing some security 
consequences).
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contemplate regular review so that “detention is calibrated to last no longer 
than necessary.”34  But even if it were possible to resolve as a theoretical 
matter how long was “necessary” to detain a would-be terrorist avowedly 
committed to the destruction of the U.S., it is not clear what kind of show-
ing (and what kind of evidence) a detainee would ever be able to present 
during such a “periodic review” that would properly convince a detaining 
power that circumstances have changed enough to eliminate the threat 
posed by the detainee.35 Would a review drawing on a psychological as-
sessment, shared with a neutral judge-like arbiter, be sufficient?  Would a 
finding of whether political conditions are sufficiently changed be neces-
sary? Given the logical impossibility of proving a negative, it is not at all 
clear what kind of factual showing would suffice to establish that “preven-
tive” detention of a suspect is no longer required. 
Or consider the matter in terms of the incentives likely to shape the 
decisions of the detaining state.  Imagine that a state detains someone for a 
single, time-limited period of “preventive” detention, with the possibility of 
seeking a renewal period of detention following some (more or less rigor-
ous) degree of review.  The state’s options following the first of such pe-
riods include: (1) releasing the detainee; (2) seeking a continuation of the 
detention; or (3) charging the detainee with a crime. Political incentives in a 
democracy seem likely to disfavor release.  That is, the potential short-term 
tactical advantage of detaining an individual will always outweigh strategic 
goals like winning hearts and minds (particularly goals whose realization 
may be beyond the political event horizon).36 By comparison, continued 
detention may seem an attractive option. But then the detaining state must 
bear the significant strategic costs of an effectively indefinite scheme, in-
cluding the cost of losing the support of allies and “wavering neutrals.”37
34 See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 410.  
35 See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 394 (“Unlike detentions predicated on deportation, howev-
er, pure security-based detentions have no intrinsic mechanism for establishing an end-date 
to detention.”). 
36 See AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at 
103–04 (2007) (attributing CIA’s failure in 2000 to track known Al Qaeda operatives from 
Malaysia to Thailand in part to short-term needs crowding out even slightly longer term 
requirements) (“Without strong incentives to reward analysts for peering over the horizon, 
following cases over time, and developing strategic intelligence, the urgent crowded out the 
important.”); see also WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 4–5 (“Across the board, 
the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of 
the world’s most dangerous actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten 
years ago. . . . The Intelligence Community we have today is buried beneath an avalanche of 
demands for ‘current intelligence.’”).  
37 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (“Such trials would hamper the war 
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our 
commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to 
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is 
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Detention followed by prosecution thus seems a comparatively advanta-
geous choice.
The foregoing should suggest that there are strong security reasons 
to favor the limited pre-trial detention regime the U.S. has now.  One might 
certainly argue in favor of a more extended period of permissible pre-trial 
detention to permit evidence gathering, and one could imagine relatively 
modest amendments to the Bail Reform Act or particular terrorism-related 
offenses with respect to this time period.38 The key challenge attending such 
a system—namely, deciding when to seize a suspect and when to watch-
and-wait in the hope of gaining more information—is a problem that has 
long plagued those who enforce existing laws of criminal conspiracy.  But 
as with other such balancing problems, it cannot be solved by describing the 
detention as “preventive” rather than pre-prosecution in nature.   
B. Preventing Terrorist Associations 
A second case in which a state might contemplate administrative 
detention arises when the only evidence of a threat is an individual’s mem-
bership in a terrorist or otherwise suspect organization. Consider for present 
purposes a particularly tough case, recognizing that there will be far less 
certainty surrounding the detention of many who might be subject to a 
scheme of “preventive” detention.  The putative detainee here is an individ-
ual who is not particularly “guilty” or “innocent,” but rather is a self-
described Al Qaeda terrorist, discovered in a known Al Qaeda safe house, 
who (he tells anyone who will listen) “looks forward to the day when he has 
the chance to kill innocent civilians.” There is no evidence he has commit-
ted any criminal act. Would detaining such an individual help prevent ter-
rorism? 
For the same reasons tactical detention may be in tension with stra-
tegic success, it is not clear that detaining such a person would ultimately 
prevent more terrorist acts than detention would promote. Imagine that the 
                                                     
ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his 
efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is 
it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial 
and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”).  
38 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1993) (affording magistrate judges substantial discretion in determin-
ing whether a suspect should be held in custody pending trial). As it stands, the Act estab-
lishes a rebuttable presumption that nothing but detention will reasonably ensure the safety 
of the community where the defendant is facing federal terrorism charges. 18 U.S.C. § 
3142(e) (1993).  Federal courts have been remarkably generous in terrorism cases in uphold-
ing pre-trial detention under the statute against constitutional due process challenges. See
generally United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2000) (approving against due 
process test a thirty to thirty-three month pre-trial detention period of a suspect in the bomb-
ings of U.S. embassies in Africa on the grounds, among others, of the gravity of the charges 
and the risk of flight).  
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man who looks forward to the day when he “has the chance to kill innocent 
civilians” has not yet (to the knowledge of the relevant law enforcement 
authority) involved himself in an ongoing plot. Releasing him might allow 
intelligence to track him and gain otherwise unavailable information about 
any plot, if it exists. Detaining him, on the other hand, might prevent him
from participating in any particular plot.  But if security analyses of the na-
ture of al Qaeda and associated jihadist threats are to be believed, the whole 
problem is that men like this grow on the proverbial trees.39  He is replacea-
ble. Worse, if the U.S. detains too many such men, or detains the wrong 
men, or detains men under a system believed to be illegitimate, we trade his 
particular incapacitation for the need to incapacitate many more.40 What this 
vision describes is an approach to detention that fails ultimately to prevent 
an attack, but that succeeds in enhancing terrorist recruiting efforts overall. 
Whatever law might make doable, it cannot explain why this approach is 
desirable. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Beyond its particular policy arguments, this essay also aims to pro-
voke a different kind of debate among legal scholars—a debate that wades 
more critically into the substantive claims underlying security arguments for 
legal change. Lawyers are constantly called on to become instant experts in 
the partially discretionary business of government policy—from drug regu-
lation to agricultural protection. There is no categorical difference in the 
analytical skills required to evaluate policies affecting national security pol-
icies and policies in other complex areas of government work. And there is 
a substantial degree of commonality: government policy-makers have broad 
discretion, but it is discretion that may be exercised only within the limits 
set by law. 
Particularly given the prominent role lawyers have played in securi-
ty policy in recent years—both for good and for ill—it seems lawyers bear 
some particularly acute responsibility for engaging the merits of the security 
39 See, e.g., DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 6–7 (2005) (arguing that 2005 
Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 and wounded more than 1,800, by Islamic extrem-
ists demonstrated that “terrorism is not the exclusive province of the membership of al Qaeda 
and its affiliated groups, that it requires no special al Qaeda training, equipment, indoctrina-
tion, or experience”); see also id. at 7 (“All that is necessary are the most portable, least 
detectable tools of the terrorist trade: ideas.  And Madrid shows all too plainly that people 
who hold these ideas and want to act on them live in the heart of the West. Their number is 
growing, and so too is the danger they pose.”).  
40 See Daniel Benjamin & Gabriel Weimann, What the Terrorists Have in Mind, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at A21 (describing how jihadist websites have used images from Abu 
Ghraib to promote recruitment efforts).  
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case before again diving, security waters untested, into the legal swamp that 
will surely continue to attend the deployment of any such system, particu-
larly by the United States. More directly, it seems that those who advocate 
for further expansion of government power (such as would accompany a 
new security detention regime) should bear the burden of persuasively mak-
ing the security case.  
